Iran on the verge of a nervous breakdown

On 28 August, the European troika – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – triggered the “snap-back” mechanism, reactivating the UN sanctions against Iran. That safeguard clause, adopted in 2015 as part of the Vienna agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, enables any party to the agreement which detects an infringement to notify the Security Council. If the conflict remains unsettled after thirty days, all the sanctions adopted in 2006 and 2010 by the Council against Iran - arms embargo, travel restrictions against Iranian officials as well as a ban on projects of military cooperation, and certain exports - may then be revived.

Since diplomatic relations between Iran and the west are already at a standstill, this threat is akin to the ultimate means of pressure in western hands.

In a weakened country, this measure increases the economic pressure on a population already afflicted by the Israeli and US bombings in June, by inflation and by the austerity policies implemented for several years now. All of which is now exacerbated by an unprecedented water crisis.

A water-intensive agriculture

In Tehran, a city with a population of over nine million, rainfall is steadily diminishing, aggravating the combined consequences of global warming, decades of mismanagement and a run-down water supply system. The rapid depletion of the water tables fuels the anger of the population, already aggravated by societal pressures, economic difficulties and unequal access to resources.

UN statistics place Iran among the countries with the highest degree of water stress. In 2021, 81 % of the country’s renewable water sources were used up. At this rate there is no safety margin to cope with drought and other climatic hiccoughs. On a national scale, the data provided by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) confirm the predominance of agricultural use (almost 90% of water consumption) which constitutes the main cause of water stress.

In 2024-2025, under its program of guaranteed purchases, the state bought 12 million tons of wheat from the country’s farmers, a historic record which enabled it to claim the country’s near self-sufficiency in grain. However a large part of its agriculture is specialised in fruits and vegetables which are water-intensive sectors - as are pistachio nuts, grown mostly for the export market - with no real adaptation to the increasing scarcity of the resource.

This bad management is exhausting the water tables even more and is making the country all the more liable to scarcities. But rice, the staple food and daily dish for Iranians, is still largely imported, mainly from India, which provides four-fifths of annual consumption, far ahead of the other suppliers. Livestock are fed on corn, most of which comes from Brazil, plus small quantities from a few other countries.

Contaminated water and land subsidence

Data recently provided by the Tehran Water and Sewage Company (Abfa) show that around 11 % of its water is physically lost through leakage. A similar amount is attributable to losses apparently due to theft, fraud or defective meters. Altogether some 22 % of the water goes unbilled. This situation is made worse by chronic underinvestment in the maintenance of the network. The prices of water are set by the state according to the principle of “consumption alignment”- which is to say they are slightly higher for homes which use a lot of water - but remain very low on the whole and do not cover actual costs. This choice, together with budget cuts dictated by the austerity policy, prevents the state from investing in the upkeep and modernisation of the network.

Finally, mapping Tehran’s western corridor (Shahriyar), teams from the Iranian Institute of Water Research established the connection between over-pumping, the drop in water table levels, and soil damage. Nearly 60-70 % of Tehran’s waste water seeps into the ground because of an inadequate sewage system, which causes the water table to rise from one to two meters per year and as much as ten meters in some areas. Which causes serious problems of contamination and soil stability.

Here is the testimony of a woman living in the North-East of Tehran: “In our neighbourhood, sometimes the tapwater has a weird smell. We’re told not to drink it. But we can’t always afford water in bottles.”

In greater Tehran, ground subsidence sometimes reaches as much as several dozen centimetres per year, putting buildings at risk, as well as roads, power lines, pipelines and the underground. This subsidence phenomenon , confirmed by scientific studies and remote sensing techniques, also concerns other cities such as Isfahan in central Iran, where it endangers historical monuments and heritage sites.

“We’re left to roast while they go swimming”

In addition to that water stress, there is the vulnerability of the energy system, revealed brutally during the summer of 2025. In June, Israel bombed several Iranian infrastructural installations - refineries and fuel depots around Tehran, as well as part of the huge South Pars gas field, the main provider for the country’s thermal plants. Those strikes reduced the supply of gas causing power cuts in several provinces.

In the wake of that offensive, July brought an exceptional heat wave - over 50° Celsius in several cities in the south-west. It caused an unprecedented surge in power consumption, upsetting the balance between supply and demand, according to the Ministry of Energy. The drought caused a drop in hydro-electric power while the ageing of the national grid, aggravated by the lack of investment against a background of austerity, has increased its vulnerability. To limit demand, the authorities ordered an exceptional one-day closure of government offices and banks.

Almost daily power cuts in Tehran and 28 other cities, sometimes more than four hours a day, are highly disruptive to households, businesses, public services and industry. Behind these scheduled cuts lie tales of suffocating heat, deprivation and unbearable inequalities. A grocer in the south of Tehran complains bitterly :

“Here, in Molavi , we have power cuts every day of the week, sometimes two per day. And up north, in their apartments with swimming pools, the power cuts happen once a week, if at all. With this terrible heat, we’re left to roast while they go swimming.”

On a social network, a civil engineering student wrote : “ In the university dormitory there is no water for hours on end. We can’t even take a shower, we’re sticky with sweat in this heat, waiting for it to come on again.” A housewife:

“I take care of my bedridden mother. My back aches but I have to climb the stairs because the lift isn’t working. And since there’s no running water, I buy jerrycans which I have to carry by myself up to the apartment. Nobody cares about us.”

Deep discontent

Given these crises, the idea of moving the capital has surfaced again in 2025. Two study groups were set up to evaluate the transfer of certain functions to Mokran on the south-east coast, but no decision has been taken. The main arguments of those in favour of the move are the pollution, the subsidence and the water shortages in Tehran. Their opponents denounce a hasty and unrealistic project, arguing that the necessary billions would be better spent on modernising the existing capital.

The political debate itself reflects these tensions. The reformists call for structural changes, a modernisation of the networks and better cooperation with international institutions. In August, former MP Mahmoud Sadeghi published an article on the website of the daily Shargh in which he wrote that “no economy of resistance can function without water security”.

The conservatives, expressing themselves on 30 July in Kayhan, Iran’s oldest newspaper, argue in favour of increasing supply with new dams, inter-basin transfers and pumping stations in order to reinforce national self-sufficiency and avoid strategic dependency at a time of sanctions.

A third approach, proposed by certain experts, favours integrated management of demand, with tiered pricing, wastewater recycling and tackling loss from leaks, considered more effective in the short term than big infrastructure projects.

The present crisis is the combined result of past political choices, climate constraints, and economic pressures exacerbated by international sanctions and regional tensions, to which is now added the very real threat of military escalation. For much of the population, this everyday life fuels a feeling of injustice and the constant bitterness of a future with no prospects. Are the absence of ambitious structural reforms and the persistence of external tensions not liable to threaten the country’s internal security and trigger a major internal crisis ?

Translated from French by Noël Burch.