On May 10, the new Emir of Kuwait, Mechaal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who succeeded his half-brother Nawaf Al-Ahmed in December 2023, put an abrupt end to the political crisis that has been engulfing his country for more than a decade. He announced the dissolution of the Parliament (majlis al Umma) and the suspension of « certain articles » of the constitution, for a maximum period of four years. The aim was to enforce a return to political stability and, presumably, to resolve the challenging issue of succession. This point was achieved on June 1, with the appointment of Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, former Prime Minister from 2019 to 2022 (see box below).
In the event of dissolution, the constitution states that the Emir must organise snap elections within a maximum of two months (art. 107) - which Mechaal does not intend to do. It also stipulates that the choice of the new Crown Prince must be validated by a majority of MPs (art. 4 para. 3) within one year of the accession to the throne (art. 4 para. 2). The suspension of seven constitutional articles has thus already enabled the new Emir to decide the question of succession and nominate the Crown Prince without the approval of the Parliament, whose interference in the matter he had openly denounced. Some rumours had gone as far as to suggest that his preference might go to one of his sons to pass the power to a new generation, as is now the case in the order of succession in the five other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states but his choice only partially broke with Kuwait’s succession traditions.
The contradictions of a limited parliamentary system
For more than a decade, the political life in Kuwait has been characterized by parliamentary instability: almost no legislature completed its four-year mandate1. While the rulers hoped that every election would break the political deadlock by sending to the parliament a majority of MPs who want to cooperate with the government, all recent elections have been won by the opposition – when it it did boycott them2. In the absence of political parties and therefore of voting discipline, the term “opposition” refers to those, among the 50 MPs who refuse to vote systematically in favour of the government’s agenda.
As a result, the reality covers a wide range of political positions, which can be described as liberal or, on the contrary, conservative - Islamist or tribal - some of which are sometimes described as populist because of their declared desire to represent «the people» against the traditional economic elites. Kuwait’s parliamentary system reflects the emirate’s social evolution, and the opposition embodies the growing power of the middle classes, conveying its frustrations and aspirations.
But the social democratisation of the political elites is limited by the constitutional definition of the role as MPs: although MPs can be appointed ministers (the appointment of at least one of them being compulsory), the government does not emanate from the Parliament’s majority. However, the Parliament has the power to propose and debate the laws, and to grill ministers and vote individual motions of censure against them- including against the Prime Minister, whose first questioning dates to 2009. These powers, in particular to hold the executive to account and force its resignation, are unrivalled in the other Gulf monarchies. They are part of the « exceptionalism » of Kuwait, an emirate where the parliamentary life is grounded in a comparatively greater liberalism and livelier press than in the rest of the region. This Kuwaiti idiosyncrasy dates back to 1962 and the adoption of a constitution that established a semi-democratic monarchical system. Faced with the existential threat of Iraqi irredentism, the reform-minded Emir Abdallah Al-Salim (1950-1965), intended, by adopting this constitution, to ascertain the legitimacy of the emirate in its efforts to gain diplomatic recognition. At the time, Kuwait’s economic elite, that had embraced Arab nationalism and demanded political participation, supported wholeheartedly this democratic particularism.
From then on, Kuwait has followed a singular trajectory within the GCC. Kuwaiti citizens cherish their representative system, preventing the Al-Sabah family, until this day, from backtracking on the democratic gains - however imperfect they may be. Indeed, even though parliament has already been unconstitutionally dissolved on two occasions, between 1976 and 1981 and again between 1986 and 1992, its prerogatives have always been restored, along with the constitution, under popular pressure and, as in 1989, following a campaign orchestrated by former MPs in their diwaniya (the Kuwaiti name for majlis or social space within the private house).
On the eve of the Iraqi invasion in 1990, Emir Jaber tried in vain to replace the Parliament with a council whose powers had been significantly reduced: the Kuwaitis made the return of the Parliament one of their major demands during negotiations with the royal family in exile, prior to the liberation in 1991.
How to discredit representative democracy in the Gulf
Yet the power of scrutiny enjoyed by the Parliament has gradually changed: from a salutary safeguard, it is now perceived and mainly described as a power of obstruction. Historically, however, this right of elected representatives to scrutinise the government’s actions has had important consequences: firstly, on the country’s development model, since the close scrutiny exercised by MPs over the granting of state-owned land has, for example, slowed down the real estate frenzy that underpins the rapid and speculative development of other Gulf countries. From a social perspective, the parliament has become the voice of the nationals, and has witnessed the expression of opinion within its walls that emphasises «national preference», pushing for a limit on the number of foreigners or the maintenance of the ban on the sale of alcohol without indulging the wishes of foreigners. This contrasts again with the situation in other emirates keen to attract foreign tourists or residents. The presence of a vocal opposition in the Parliament has also been identified as the reason why the Kuwaiti government did not go ahead with the scheme of attributing the economic citizenship of the Comoros to its bidoun population, as was the case in the United Arab Emirates.
But the « economic miracles» of the latter - led by Dubai since the 2000s, then followed by Abu Dhabi, Doha and now Saudi Arabia - have overshadowed Kuwait’s successes, already undermined by the Iraqi invasion, and the glorious days of its parliamentary political system are gone. In the current context of increasing authoritarianism in the Gulf, the Kuwaiti model seems dysfunctional. The Parliament’s blocking of necessary reforms and the waltz of ministers, being forced to resign, are the reasons put forward to explain the economic «backwardness» of the emirate - and to lament its golden age.
The country’s economic reputation suffers from a lack of cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. For example, Kuwait is poorly evaluated by the rating agencies because of the financing problems that affect its budget during phases of low oil prices, but these are primarily a problem of liquidity. To be able to raise money on the international markets, the government needs to pass a law in Parliament authorising it to do so. However, the opposition-dominated Parliament refused to do so, in a political showdown that forced the government to dip into the reserves of its sovereign wealth fund earmarked for future generations (the Future Generations Fund), which proved to be a highly unpopular measure.
Kuwaitis are impatient to see their own futuristic megaprojects materialise, and despair at the slow pace at which they are being implemented. On 22 September 2023, the government announced a five-year delay in the implementation of its development strategy, which aims to create a hub for trade in the northern Gulf region: the «Silk City», mega-project on China’s Silk Road, ambitions to create of a new city of 700,000 inhabitants, which would include an free economic zone spread on the five uninhabited islands of the north-east, and, among others, the container port of Mubarak Al-Kabir, on the Boubyan island. But the country seems to be struggling to attract the necessary foreign investment and, as a result, is largely discredited.
Kuwait pales in comparison with its Gulf neighbours, that are marshalling their resources towards the goal of economic diversification, under the leadership of a generation of new rulers, endowed with personal charisma and dynamism, from Mohammed Ben Zayed in the United Arab Emirates to Mohammed Ben Salman in Saudi Arabia and Tamim Ben Hamad Al-Thani in Qatar. Are these leaders not living proof that, to reform a country and move it forward, a strong man is better than an elected parliament that paralyses political decision-making? The blatant dysfunctions of Kuwait’s «semi-democracy» thus provide an ideal justification for alternative models advocating the resort to a strongman.
The population’s ’wait and see’
Kuwaitis themselves are torn between different feelings. A survey carried out in February and March 2024 (before the dissolution) by the Arab Barometer in collaboration with Harvard University showed that while the majority of citizens polled expressed frustration with the role played by parliament, they nevertheless remained very attached to the political principle of electoral representation. 66% of Kuwaitis said they agreed that the Parliament was hindering the government’s effective action; the same percentage recognised the importance of its role as a control body over government action.
The Kuwaiti population is aware of the political deadlock and seemed, in the face of the parliament’s dissolution to be willing to ‘wait and see’, hoping that the Emir, like a deus ex-machina, was interfering to provide a solution to the crisis. Even if certain facts, such as the arrest of three former MPs, or the suspension of the article guaranteeing parliamentary immunity (art. 181), point towards a clear authoritarian strengthening, which may have dissuaded people from too immediate criticism. Public expression of disapproval of the Emir’s decision has been fairly moderate, including among the MPs, who had just been elected on April 4, 2024. In the aforementioned poll, 57% of those polled thought that the solution to the country’s institutional ills could come from « new legislative elections based on a new electoral law » which had been the way out of the previous crises of parliamentary suspensions – as the mobilisation against the suspensions had needed time to emerge. Emir Mechaal’s announcement of the formation of a committee tasked with amending the constitution could lend credence to this latter hypothesis. Yet this is just one scenario among others, the most pessimistic versions predicting Kuwait’s alignment with the political system of its Gulf neighbours, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Matters of succession
No one knows what the Emir’s plans were when suspending the Parliament. As compared to previous instances, it should be noted, in this case, that one of the factors contributing to the political paralysis has been the role played by the Parliament in the succession, which has been uncertain since Sabah came to power in 2006. Invisible on the surface, the negotiations linked to the succession have in fact poisoned the Kuwaiti political life.
Until the 2000s, the Parliament had only a procedural or honorary role in the choice of the Crown Prince, endorsing the choices made by the royal family. But this role increased significantly when the position of Crown Prince, then held by Saad Abdallah, got dissociated from that of Prime Minister, that went to Sabah Al-Ahmed, in 2003, and, later in 2006, when the latter had a parliamentary vote declare the former unfit and proclaim him Emir in his stead. By breaking with the practice of alternating branches - which has since been abandoned - this manoeuvring multiplied the number of potential candidates for succession and gave to the Parliament a new strategic importance , with each would-be Crown Prince seeking to secure a base of support among MPs - or conversely shunning away from government responsibility so as not to dent his capital of political sympathy. While Sabah Al-Ahmed, former foreign minister from 1963 to 2003, and a fine politician, enjoyed a certain prestige and many supporters within the Parliament, the situation became much more complicated for his successors, who had to enter the ring. They sometimes clashed through MPs, fighting by proxy, as was the case, for example, between Nasser Al-Mohamed and Fahd Al-Ahmed in the second half of the 2000s, a rivalry that drew a clear dividing line between the economic elite and the Islamist and tribal opposition, until the corrupt exercise of power somehow disqualified them. In fact, no prince of the new generation seemed to stand out as a consensus candidate for the succession.
The new Emir has thus regained control and cut short the growing role of the Parliament in succession matters, which remain the prerogative of the Al-Sabah family, as well as its attempts to influence the choice of the Crown Prince. Unlike his predecessors, Emir Mechaal has not held any ministerial posts, but, coming from a security, defence and intelligence background, he has no appetite for political games.
In the absence of a parliament willing to interfere in both the composition of the government and the choice of the Crown Prince, the Emir and the Council of Ministers will assume power and govern by decree, bearing full responsibility for bringing about the long-awaited economic and political reforms. On several occasions in his speeches, Emir Mechaal has warned against what he described as the “misuse of democracy” to justify the decision he took on 10 May 2024: it is now up to him to reinvent the terms of the Kuwaiti political system if he wants to preserve its historic achievements.
On June 1, Mechaal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah chose Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah as his successor. Born in 1953 and a diplomat by training, Sabah was ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1995 to 1998. He held various ministerial posts, in particular as foreign minister from 2011 to 2019, before heading four successive governments under the late Emir Nawaf until April 2022 – that had stormy relations with parliament. The Emir, Mechaal, chose a candidate who was controversial in parliament, but probably consensual within the royal family. In fact, the appointment of Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah renews inheritance practices while complying with the constitution (art 4. al. 1) stipulating that the supreme power of the emirate must be vested in the descendants of Mubarak Al-Sabah (1896-1915): for the first time, the future Emir stems from the Hamad branch -Hamad being Mubarak’s fourth son and is not the son of a previous Emir.
1Except for the 2016 legislature. Since 2006, the National Assembly has been dissolved ten times and its formation annulled three times by the Constitutional Court.
2The opposition boycotted the 2012 and 2013 elections to protest against the amendment of the electoral law, decided unilaterally by the executive.