If Donald Trump had had his way, high noon on Saturday 15 February would have seen Israel resume its blitz on Gaza, destroying what little remains to be destroyed and driving the 2m or so Palestinians there into exile.
Trump had suggested that Israel demand the return by that mid-day of all 76 of the remaining Israeli hostages (including the remains of the 35 or so believed to be dead), and if not, “let hell break out”. Hamas had earlier threatened to call off the scheduled Saturday release of another three hostages unless the Israelis lifted the curbs it said they had imposed on the flow of aid into the battered enclave, especially shelter items.
Egyptian and Qatari mediators ironed out the problem, as they had done with previous hitches. But Benyamin Netanyahu’s far right government meanwhile took up the threat of unleashing hell if “our hostages” were not freed by the deadline, and massed troops in and around Gaza. It was left unclear whether they were demanding the release of all 76, or the 17 due to be freed over the current 42-day first phase of the Gaza agreement, or just the three originally meant to be freed that Saturday in line with the accord.
In the event, the sixth hostage handover of Phase 1 went ahead smoothly, with three Israeli men, looking as fit and healthy as could be expected given their ordeal, handed over to the International Red Cross and thence back to Israel in exchange for the release of 369 Palestinian prisoners, 36 of them serving long-term sentences and the rest Gazans picked up at random with no charges. As before, and against the wishes of the Red Cross, Hamas turned the handover into a spectacle aimed at conveying the message that it is still strong and in control, with hundreds of heavily-armed, smartly-uniformed fighters, some toting advanced Israeli combat weapons probably seized in the 7 October 2023 raid, cordoning off a large square and displaying the hostages on a stage festooned with Hamas banners and slogans.
With the closing stages of the first phase set to continue (14 more days, 14 more hostages) did this mean that some daylight was opening up between Netanyahu and Trump, who had railed against the release of hostages in “dribs and drabs”? Not really. Trump is clearly in tune with the more vocally extreme elements in the Israeli cabinet, Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, but Netanyahu could not simply junk the elaborately-negotiated and signed agreement, especially as the highly-emotive issue of hostage lives was at stake. At the security cabinet meeting where the exchange was approved, he is reported to have told his ministers not to give interviews or mention the Trump plan, to avoid appearing to act counter to the volatile US president.
So the focus shifted to the second phase of the accord, which was supposed to see the release of all Israeli hostages and many more Palestinian prisoners, and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip. It would mean the end of the war, with preparations for a third phase devoted to reconstruction.
Negotiations on Phase 2 were meant to start on 4 February, but two weeks went by before movement started in that direction, and it was clearly going to be a minefield. The issue of who would control and govern Gaza had been left open. As the TV screens glaringly showed, Hamas was still very much there and in charge. All attempts had failed to encourage an alternative local leadership, or to posit a takeover by the decrepit and discredited Palestinian Authority from the West Bank. Netanyahu hates the PA at least as much as he does Hamas, because the PA wants a two-state solution. “There will be no Hamas and no PA in Gaza after the war,” he said on 17 February. “I am committed to U.S. President Trump’s plan for the realization of a different Gaza.”
“Any plan that leaves Hamas in charge of Gaza will be unacceptable to Israel,” said Trump’s Secretary of State Marco Rubio. After talks with Netanyahu on 16 February, he added : “Hamas cannot continue as a military or government force. It must be eliminated or eradicated.”
“The next phase of the hostage deal remains under great threat,” concluded Amir Tibon in Haaretz. “It is clear that Netanyahu wants the deal to collapse and the war to resume, and that he is doing everything in his power to make that happen.”
A real estate hustler’s fantasy
That would be the only way to enable Trump’s “plan” for the US to “take over, own and cherish” a Gaza flattened beyond redemption and devoid of its Palestinian inhabitants, who would be rehoused happily and permanently in “beautiful communities” elsewhere while their Gaza was reborn as an incredible Riviera.
It’s a real estate hustler’s fantasy that collides head-on with every sanctity and imperative in Arab history and politics. Egypt and Jordan immediately rejected Trump’s suggestion that they take in the 2m or so Palestinians from Gaza. He was presumably assuming that the several billion dollars both receive in US military and economic aid would leverage obedience. But there are some issues that are beyond pressure and bribery. It would be an existential threat for King Abdullah’s Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in particular. He knows that if the Gazans are displaced, the much closer and more numerous inhabitants of the West Bank, where things are already hotting up dangerously, would not be far behind.
No Arab leader can go down in history as collaborating in a second Nakba, the first being the displacement of Palestinians by the creation of Israel in 1948. The Saudis, who Trump is counting on to join Israel in an expanded Abraham Accord despite Gaza, know this as well as any, and have long made it unequivocally clear that there is no way normalisation will happen without a clear pathway to a Palestinian state. They were further irked by Netanyahu’s facetious suggestion that if they were so keen on that, why not establish it in the Kingdom?
Riyadh set about rallying the Arabs behind a plan to counter the Trump scheme, with Egypt and others working on the details of a formula for reconstructing the Strip without displacing its inhabitants. The key issue is whether Hamas could be induced to stand aside, and who would take political and security control.
Whatever the arrangement, Hamas would still be the power behind the camouflage. Would Israel accept such a cosmetic ploy, or, with Trump’s backing, go all out to complete its war aim of destroying Hamas? That would complete the conversion of Gaza into a totally unlivable hell on earth, to which it is already pretty close. If that were to happen and the doors were opened, the bulk of the population might have no option but to stream out for the sake of simple survival. “Give them a choice. Not forcible eviction. Not ethnic cleansing,” as Netanyahu said.
Netanyahu hailed Trump as the best friend Israel has ever had in the White House. The question now is whether the American president can treat the Arab side of the equation as amounting to nothing. And if he does, whether he is right.
If the Gaza issue might produce some Arab pushback against Trump’s wilder notions, Israel’s ambition to deal with Iran is less contentious, though further conflict is unlikely to be welcomed by the Gulf countries. The Saudis, UAE and others roundly condemned Israel’s large-scale attack on Iran on 26 October last year - their relations with Tehran have improved considerably since Trump’s first term.
“We can and will finish the job” in Iran
But Iran is certainly in the crosshairs. After meeting with Secretary of State Rubio on 16 February, Netanyahu said that with President Trump’s support, “I have no doubt we can and will finish the job.” While Rubio said that Israel and the US “stand shoulder to shoulder” against Iran, it remains to be seen whether Trump, who supposedly prefers making deals to making war, would prefer to squeeze Iran into quasi-submission rather than encouraging or engaging in conflict.
The effect of Israel’s devastating blows to Iran’s regional allies is being felt strongly in Lebanon, where the new government formed by PM Nawaf Salam on 8 February clearly reflected a new balance of power, with Hezbollah and its allies losing their ability to veto decisions they don’t like.
The day after the new cabinet held its first meeting, Israeli warplanes broke the sound barrier over Beirut, rattling windows and nerves throughout the city. It was a clear message aimed at Beirut airport, which the Israelis (through the US) threatened to bombard if it allowed flights from Tehran to land, on the accusation that such planes were bringing in cash and possibly weapons for Hezbollah. The airport cancelled the incoming flights, prompting protest demonstrations by Hezbollah followers around the airport in which vehicles of the UN peacekeepers UNIFIL were attacked and burned. The Salam government went further, and cancelled all flights to and from Iran until further notice.
Isreael retains 5 strategic hilltop positions in Lebanon
Under the 27 November ceasefire agreement last year between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli forces were supposed to leave Lebanon by 27 January, but the deadline was pushed back to 18 February. Though the accord’s co-sponsor France insisted the Israelis should then pull out fully, the US did not oppose Israel’s decision to retain five strategic hilltop positions in southern Lebanon. Israel also continued to carry out strikes on what it deemed Hezbollah targets in the Beqaa Valley, and on 17 February assassinated a Hamas officer with a drone strike on his car in the Lebanese city of Sidon. The concept of “ceasefire” seemed to be somewhat relative.
This article appeared also in the site codastory.com